



Department of State
TELEGRAM

30

(37) X R POL 1 CAMB-45

POL 27 VIETS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 250 DC/MR

REVIEWED BY Subley DATE 10/9/80

PAGE 01 281100Z

51 S
ACTION EA 15

INFO OCT 01, UPW 01, LO 13, ACDA 16, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 03, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, EUR 17, E 15

RSR 01/142 W

040395

P 280928Z AUG 69
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 27

S. E. C. R. E. T PHNOM PENH 32

1. ALTHOUGH I HAVE BEEN IN PHNOM PENH LESS THAN TWO WEEKS I WOULD LIKE TO OFFER SOME OBSERVATIONS REGARDING US-CAMBODIAN RELATIONS PRESENT AND FUTURE AND SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR US ATTITUDES AND TACTICS, IF NOT ACTUAL CHANGES IN POLICY.
2. WHILE MOST IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE US POLICY IS PRESENTLY TO RESTRICT OR STOP USE OF CAMBODIAN TERRITORY BY VC/NVA FORCES AS SANCTUARY OR SUPPLY ROUTE, IT OBVIOUS WE HAVE RELATIVELY LITTLE DIRECT LEVERAGE WITH WHICH PERSUADE RKG COMPLY OUR DESIRES.
3. NEVERTHELESS, AS EVIDENCED CAMBODIAN ACTIONS AGAINST VC/NVA BOTH IN THE FIELD AND IN PRESS OVER LAST MONTHS AND AS STATED BY SIHANOUK DURING CODEL MANSFIELD VISIT, IT EVIDENT RKG UNHAPPY PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. RKG WOULD CLEARLY LIKE SEE VC/NVA DEPART CAMBODIA ALMOST AS MUCH AS WE WOULD. HOWEVER, RKG IS JUST AS CLEARLY UNABLE EFFECT PHYSICAL REMOVAL VC/NVA WITHOUT LATTER'S COOPERATION.
4. ONLY LEVERAGES RKG HAS ON VC/NVA ARE PATROLLING OF CERTAIN AREAS CAMBODIA IN ORDER LIMIT VC/NVA ACTIVITY, CURRENT PUBLIC EXPOSE AND PRESS ATTACKS ON VC/NVA ACTIVITIES, AND POSSIBLE DENIAL OF SUPPLY ROUTES, PRINCIPALLY THAT VIA SIHANOUKVILLE (LATTER ACTION SEEMS DOUBTFUL IN VIEW SIHANOUK'S CONTINUED DENIAL THAT PORT USED FOR ARMS SHIPMENTS TO VC/NVA).
5. FROM CONVERSATIONS THUS FAR WITH DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES AND WITH

SECRET
26

(3)

Phnom Penh 32
5-28-69



DECLASSIFIED
Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 281100Z

CERTAIN NUMBER OF FRENCH ADVISERS AND A FEW CAMBODIANS, IT APPEARS THAT DEFOLIATION ISSUE MOST IMPORTANT ONE WITH POSSIBLY THE APPOINTMENT OF AN AMBASSADOR BEING NUMBER TWO (ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IS FREQUENTLY MENTIONED BY BUSINESSMEN AND CAMBODIANS HOPING FOR JOBS BUT THUS FAR NOT BY OFFICIALS).

6. I BELIEVE THEREFORE THAT US DOES HAVE AN INDIRECT LEVERAGE ON FUTURE CAMBODIAN ACTIONS VIA OUR ACTIONS TO ABOVE AND OTHER ACTIONS SUGGESTED BELOW. ON QUESTION DEFOLIATION DAMAGES AND OTHER CLAIMS AND THE PREPARATION OF US COUNTER-CLAIMS, I HAVE BEEN DISTURBED ALWAYS SEE THESE LUMPED TOGETHER. REPLYING TO CAMBODIAN CLAIMS WITH OUR COUNTER-CLAIMS WILL IN MY OPINION MERELY INFURIATE CAMBODIA (ANGRY PRESS ARTICLES HAVE ALREADY REFERRED TO US PRESS STORIES OF PREPARATIONS AMERICAN COUNTER-CLAIMS) AND BRING US AGAIN INTO IMPOSSIBLE IMPASSE. I REALIZE DEPT ALSO WORRIED ABOUT PREPARATION CAMBODIAN PAPER TO LIST ALL ALLEGED US AND SVN ACTS, DAMAGES ETC. AGAINST CAMBODIA AND WHICH REPORTEDLY TO BE DISTRIBUTED THROUGHOUT WORLD.

7. HOWEVER, IF USG ACTS PROMPTLY TO DEMONSTRATE GOODWILL AND SINCERE DESIRE RESOLVE ISSUES WITH CAMBODIA, I AM CONVINCED THERE IS GOOD CHANCE PERSUADING RKG LESSEN DIRECT AND INDIRECT SUPPORT VC/NVA, NOT PUBLISH BOOK MENTIONED ABOVE AND NEGOTIATE OTHER CLAIMS OF BOTH SIDES IN SERIOUS FASHION.

8. IN FIRST PLACE, I WOULD URGE THAT EXPERTS DECIDE APPROXIMATELY HOW MUCH A REASONABLE TOTAL FOR DEFOLIATION DAMAGE MIGHT BE AND THEN OFFER PAY IMMEDIATELY ONE-HALF OF THAT. THIS WOULD EVIDENCE USG RESOLVE RAPIDLY SETTLE CLAIMS. EXPLANATION WOULD ALSO, OF COURSE, POINT OUT IMPOSSIBILITY FULL SETTLEMENT UNTIL TREES BACK IN PRODUCTION. THIS CLAIM SHOULD BE HANDLED SEPARATELY FROM ALL OTHERS FOR MAXIMUM EFFECT.

9. SECONDLY, I SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED MAKE NEW APPROACH RE PAYMENT TO FAMILIES TO THOSE KILLED BY US-SVN ACTION AND TO WOUNDED CAMBODIANS. (AUSTRALIANS HAVE REPEATEDLY TRIED EFFECT PAYMENTS BUT APPARENT DIFFICULTY IS TO WHOM ONE PAYS IN ORDER AVOID STICKY HANDS. I WOULD PLAN SUGGEST EITHER DIRECT PAYMENT TO FAMILIES OR TO SIHANOUK HIMSELF WITH ACCOMPANYING PUBLICITY.)

10. THIRDLY, IF AGREEMENT SHOULD SHORTLY BE REQUESTED FOR CAM-

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET



DECLASSIFIED

Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 281100Z

BODIAN AMBASSADOR, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED RECIPROCATE ASAP.

11. FOURTHLY, I SHOULD IMMEDIATELY BE SENT AND ALLOWED PRESENT TO RKG THE REMAINDER OF THE MAPS DUE UNDER MAPPING AGREEMENT OF 1957. WITHHOLDING THESE MAPS IS AN IRRITANT, IS UNPRODUCTIVE AND APPEARS USELESS SINCE WE UNDERSTAND ENTIRE SET ALREADY IN UN, WHERE CAN BE (AND PROBABLY HAVE BEEN) OBTAINED BY CAMBODIAN PERMREP.

12. FIVE, I WOULD APPRECIATE INSTRUCTIONS TO OTHER POSTS SUCH AS SAIGON AND PARIS TO CEASE REMARKS TO JOURNALISTS ABOUT CAMBODIA. I FULLY REALIZE THAT IN PAST THIS WAS USEFUL (AND ALMOST ONLY MEANS) OF PUTTING PRESSURE ON SIHANOUK. IN FUTURE, HOWEVER, COMMENTS RE CAMBODIAN AFFAIRS EMANATING FROM OFFICIAL US SOURCES OTHER THAN IN WASHINGTON AND HERE CAN ONLY CAUSE DIFFICULTIES.

13. IN SUMMARY, WHAT I AM SUGGESTING IS THAT INSOFAR AS POSSIBLE WE ATTEMPT NEW BEGINNING WITH OPENING OF NEW EMBASSY. LET US TAKE SIHANOUK AT FACE VALUE AS FAR AS WE CAN AND GIVE HIM A CHANCE TO PROVE WHAT HE CLAIMS TO BE RKG POLICY NEUTRALITY. RKG NOTE OF AUGUST 26 (PUBLISHED IN AKP OF AUGUST 27) RE DAMAGES INFLICTED BY US HELICOPTERS MAY BE TROUBLESOME BUT TO BE EXPECTED AND SHOULD NOT RPT NOT INTERFERE WITH CONTINUING EFFORTS IMPROVE US-CAMBODIAN RELATIONS AND INFLUENCE RKG TOWARD FRIENDLIER ATTITUDE. I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD LOOK AND DEAL WITH CAMBODIA AND SIHANOUK IN TWO WAYS: I.E. AS CAMBODIA ALONE AND AS CAMBODIA IN RELATION TO EVENTS IN NEIGHBORING AREAS. FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIRST AREA ARE, IN MY OPINION, BOUND TO EFFECT PROGRESS IN THE OTHER. GP-3
RIVES
BT

NNN

031100Z

SECRET